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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
WESTERN ~IACHINERY COMPANY 
A Corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs.-
H. K. RIDDLE and E. J. MAYHEW, 
Defendant-Respondent and 
Cross-Appellant. 
Case No. 
9611 
RESPONDEN'TS and CROSS-APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
8TATE11:ENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action on an agreement for the transfer 
of personal property arising out of the failure of Defend-
ants to complete payment under the agreement and the 
subsequent repossession and resale by Plaintiff. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Lower Court, sitting without a jury, found that 
the agreement was a rental contract, and allowed Plain-
tiff the rentals it claimed, plus cost of repairs and the 
cost of repossession, less the proceeds of the resale of 
the property. 
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RELIEF SOlJGHT ON APPEAL 
Cross-Appellant and Defendant E. J. 1fayhew seeks 
reversal of the Judgment of the Lower Court and the 
entry of a decree dismissing Plaintiff's complaint with 
prejudice. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about January 29, 1960, Defendants E. J. 1fay-
hew and H. K. Riddle signed the Plaintiff's form of 
"RENT'AL AGREE1lENT'' as n1odified. (Exhibit ''1,'' 
Record Page 2). It stated that the Plaintiff leased to 
the Defendants a specifically described piece of machin-
ery. Typed immediately below the description appears 
the following clause: 
"Upon receipt of final payment, Western 
Machinery Company agrees to execute a 'Bill of 
Sale' to transfer Title of this T'ractor Shovel to 
H. K. Riddle and E. J. 1\tfayhew." 
The front of the document further provides that 
Defendants agree to pay as "rentaF' the smn of $511.00 
per month. 
Deleted frmn the printed fonn is the following 
clause: 
"Said rent is to begin on the day the said 
property is delivered to Lessee, and is to end 
on the day said property is returned by said 
Lessee to Lessor, at ------------------------------···-··---·····-····" 
The contract then provides : 
"Said property is hereby leased for a term 
of 24 Months l\1:inimum Guaranteed." 
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The balance of the paragraph in the printed for:m, 
which was deleted, read : 
''and if Lessee retains said property after the 
expiration of said term, such retention shall be 
construed as a continuance of this Lease, at the 
same rental, and under the same terms, until said 
property is so returned to Lessor, at the place 
above specified. At any time after the expirations 
[sic] of said original term, upon T·HREE (3) 
days written notice to be given by Lessor to 
Lessee, Lessee agrees to return said property to 
Lessor, at said place." 
On the reverse side of the printed form appear 
certain general conditions; the last printed provisiOn 
thereon, which was deleted, read as follows : 
"Lessee further agrees to use said property 
for only one shift of eight (8) hours per day of 
twenty-four (24) hours. If Lessee desires to use 
said property for more than eight (8) hours in fu""'lY 
one twenty-four (24) hour day then such addi-
tional time is to be paid for by Lessee on a pro-
rata basis at the sa1ne rate as herein provided." 
The mac:hine \Yas delivered to Defendant H. K. Riddle 
and maintained on property owned by him until Plaintiff 
repossessed it. The value of the machine at the time the 
agreement was entered into was $10,950.00. The cost 
of repossessing the machine was $217.84, and the cost 
of repairs made prior to resale by Plaintiff after re-
possession was $804.68. The Defendant H. K. Riddle paid 
$1,000.00 to apply on the agreement on March 2, 1960; 
there were no payments applied on the contract there-
after. 
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Plaintiff repossessed the machine in April, 1961, and 
sold it in "June or July" of 1961 for $6,400.00. (Record 
page 32). No portion of the proce·eds of sale was credited 
to Defendants' account. (Record, page 32). Plaintiff 
claimed unpaid "rentals'' for the ''lease" of the machine 
of $7,176.00. 
The Lower Court concluded that the agreement was 
a rental agreement, allowed the rentals of $7,176.00 plus 
transportation charges of $217.84, and cost of repairs 
of $804.68, and reduced the sum thereof by the proceeds 
of the sale, $6,400.00, and gave Plaintiff judgment for 
$1,798.52 and attorney's fees in the sum of $500.00. 
ARGUMEN·T 
POINT I. 
ALL OF THE DEFENSES RAISED WERE WITHIN 
THE T'ERMS OF THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER, AS AMENDED, 
AND APPELLANT WAS FULLY APPRISED OF SAID DE-
FENSES. 
Plaintiff seems to contend that Defendant was not 
entitled to claim or show that the rental agreement was 
anything other than that (Plaintiff's Brief Page 3). How-
ever, the defenses raised both at the time of trial and here 
were set forth in the Pre-Trial Order, as a1nended, (Rec-
ord, Pages 9-13). The Rules of Civil Procedure provide 
that the Pre-Trial Order 
"recites the action taken at the conference, 
the amendments allowed to the pleadings and the 
agreements made by the parties as to any of the 
matters considered, and which limits the issues 
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for trial to those not disposed of by admissions 
or agreements of counsel; and such order when 
entered controls the subsequent course of the ac-
tion, unless Inodified at the trial to prevent mani-
fest injustice .... " (Rule 16, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure) 
POINT II. 
THAT THE COMPLAINT FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM 
UPON WHICH RELIEF COULD BE GRANTED AND THERE-
FORE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS, MADE AT 
THE OUTSET OF THE TRIAL AND AT THE CONCLUSION 
OF PLAINTIFF'S CASE, SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED. 
The agreement attached to Plaintiff's C01nplaint and 
introduced as Exhibit 1 in the case shows on its face that 
it is a Conditional Sales Contract as a matter of law. 
(See Point III, infra). 
Since Plaintiff and Appellant never altered its 
theory of the case, to-wit, that the contract was a rental 
agreement, both its Complaint and its case in chief had 
to stand or fall on that theory. 
Consequently, Defendant's ~:fotion to Dismiss made 
at the outset of the trial (Record, Page 18) should have 
been granted. Also the ~lotion to Dismiss Plaintiff's 
Complaint made at the close of Plaintiff's case (Record, 
Pages 27-28) should have been granted. Both of these 
motions were expressly reserved and the Lower Court 
expressly saved Defendant his rights by virtue of said 
motions (Record, Page 28, Lines 21 to 23). 
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POINT III. 
THAT 'THE AGREEMENT AS DRAWN IS NOT A RENT-
AL OR LEASE AGREEMENT BUT IS A CONDITIONAL 
SALES CONTRACT. 
It has already been called to the Court's attention 
that the form agreement has been 1nodified as set forth 
in the Statement of Facts. You will note that the contract 
contains an express provision that upon receipt of the 
24-month guaranteed payments the Plaintiff will transfer 
title to the Defendants. There is no requirement that 
the Defendants exercise any option or take any steps or 
do anything further to acquire title after 1naking payment 
for the 24-month period. !1ost of the significant portions 
of the form agreement which would indicate a lease 'have 
been deleted. 
A general statement of the law applicable to this 
situation is contained in 47 Am. Jur. 23, Sales, Section 
836 whieh reads as follows : 
" ... A conditional sale contemplates the 
passing of title at some time to the vendee and 
the payment of the purchase price; a bailment con-
templates that title shall not pass and that the 
property shall be returned to the bailor or dis-
posed of as he directs. (See 6 Am. J ur. 162, Bail-
ments, Section 35.) Of the cases wherein the 
courts have had to determine the character of 
agreements as being either conditional sales or 
bailments, a large majority possess the following 
ciharacteristics : The parties are styled 'bailor' 
and 'bailee,' or 'le,ssor' and 'lessee;' the contract 
states that the one party delivers to the other 
on hire the property forn1ing the subject matter 
of the contract; and it is provided that the re-
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ceiver of the property shall make certain pay-
ments, termed 'rentals,' amounting in all to the 
full value of the property, that the legal title or 
right of property shall remain in the person de-
livering the property, and that when all of the 
payments have been made the receiver of the 
property shall become the owner thereof. Con-
tracts of this character have been held in a major-
ity of jurisdictions to constitute conditional sales 
or absolute sales with mortgage back to secure the 
price, and not hailments or leases. (Citing many 
cases and Anno : 17 ALR 1466, s. 43 ALR 1262 and 
92 ALR 335; 9 LRA 373 ; 12 LRA 446; 7 Am. St. 
Rep. 262; 35 Am. St. Rep. 495; 46 Am. St. Rep. 
296 ; 94 Am. St. Rep. 249 ; 12 Ann. Cas. 87 6 . . .) 
''The test most frequently applied is whether 
the so-called 'lessee' is obligated to accept and 
pay for the property at smne future time, or, on 
the other hand, whether his primary obligation is 
to return or account for the property to the so-
called 'lessor' according to the terms of the 'le.ase.' 
In the latter case, according to the weight of 
authority, the transaction is a bailment. (See 
6 Am. Jur. 167, Bailments, Section 38.)" 
The above comments are confirmed and amplified 
in 17 ALB 1421 at 1466, 43 ALB 1247 at 125G, 92: ALR! 
304 at 323 and 175 ALR 1366 at 1397. 
In 17 ALR 1421 at page 1466 there appears a whole 
line of cases supporting Defendant's position that a con-
tract of the kind at issue here is a conditional sales con-
tract, which cases are prefaced by the remarks: 
"As heretofore remarked many contracts con-
taining a reservation of title provision are in the 
form of a lease, or contain language more apt for 
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a lease or a hire than for a conditional sale. In 
construing such contracts, the test generally ap-
plied to determine the character is as to ~hether 
a return of the property is within the nghts of 
the transferrer [sic] ; if he is required or is en-
titled to return the property, in lieu of paying 
the purchase price, the contract will be construed 
to be a lease, but if he is obligated to pay the 
purchase price, even though it is referred to as 
rental, the contract will be construed to be a sale-
generally a conditional sale." 
In 43 ALR 1247 at 1258 it is reported: 
''That the contract is one of conditional sale 
and not of lease, is more evident where no condi-
tional payment is required, as where the lessor 
agrees to execute and deliver a bill of sale for 
the property upon the completion of the payments 
specified in the contract. Vorenberg v. Americwa 
House Hotel Company (1923) 246 Mass. 108, 140 
NE 297.'' 
Again at 92 ALR 304 at 323 the following is reported: 
"A so-called contract of lease by which the 
lessee binds himself at once and ir:r:evocably for 
a rental equal to the full value of the thing leased, 
and is to become owner thereof when the so-called 
rental is all paid in full, and without the payment 
of any further consideration, is nothing else than 
a conditional sale disguised under the fonn of the 
lease; but the contract by which a party binds 
hlinself to pay in instalhnents a certain sum for 
the use of a thing, with the privilege of becoming 
the owner thereof upon paying a further su1n, for 
which, however, he has not bound himself abso-
lutely is simply a lease with an option to pure~1ase .. 
and is not a contract of sale. Byrd v. Cooper 
(1928) 166 La. 402, 117 So. 441." 
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Again in 175 ALR 1366 at 1397 it is reported: 
"Although the contract may refer to the pay-
ments to be made as rent, if it also provides that 
title shall pass when such rent is paid in full, it is 
a conditional contract of sale. Billiter v. Led-
better-Johnson Contractors (1939) 60 Ga. App. 
1, 2 S.E. 2d 677." 
In this case we have a delivery of the property to 
the Defendants, an unconditional promise to pay 24 
monthly payments of $511.00 each, under an agreement 
that when those payments are made the Plaintiff will 
transfer title to the Defendants without any further pay-
ment by Defendants or without an exercise of any option 
by Defendants, or indeed without any further act by 
Defendants. There is no right of the buyers to return 
the property and in fact the portion of the form con-
tract which would give the plaintiff the right to terminate 
the lease and take back the property has been deleted by 
the parties. There is no question but what this is a con-
ditional sales contract as a matter of law and not a rental 
or lease agreement. 
POINT IV. 
THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAVING REPOSSESSED 
AND SOLD THE PROPERTY WHICH WAS THE SUBJECT 
OF THE CONDITIONAL SALES CONTRACT, IT IS NOT 
ENTITLED TO ANY FURTHER RECOVERY. 
The agreement which is the subject of this action is 
a conditional sales contract. It contains no provision 
that Western Machinery Company was entitled to hold 
the Defendants liable for any deficiency in the event of 
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repossession and resale. It is undisputed that the Plain-
tiff repossessed the machinery which is the subject of the 
contract. Thereafter it retained the property for "sev-
eral months." (Record, page 32, line 14). Therefore, 
Plaintiff is precluded from any further recovery from 
Defendants at this point. 
It is the great weight of authority that where a 
conditional sales contract contains no provision for re-
possession, resale and assessment of any deficiency 
against the buyer, the seller, by repossessing, elects his 
remedy and is precluded from suing buyer for the pur-
chase price or any part thereof. 37 ALR 91, 83 ALR 959, 
99 ALR 1288, and 49 ALR 2d 15 at 66. These annotations 
contain cases too numerous to cite individually, but they 
clearly support the proposition just stated. 
The same general proposition is supported in the 
case of IXL Stores Company v. Moon (1916) 49 Utah 
262, 162 P. 622. In that case the court asks the question, 
''vVhat are the legal rights of a vendor of personal prop-
erty as against the vendee in case the vendor retains the 
title to the property until the purchase price is fully paid 
and in case of default of paYJ.nent of the purchase price, 
or any part thereof, the vendor repossesses himself of 
the property which is the subject of sale, either with 
or without the consent of the vendee f" In answer the 
Court cites authorit:\~ stating that the vendor has a choice 
of remedies. I-Ie can treat the contract as rescinded and 
recover his goods, in which case he foregoes anY other 
ren1edy. l-Ie may treat the contract as breached and sue 
for his damages. He may waive return of the goods and 
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sue for the purchase price, or he may sue for specific per-
formance holding the goods as security therefor. The 
Court held that the vendor had rescinded the contract 
because he had repossessed the properties and treated 
them as his own. 
N ot.e that in the case at bar the vendor has done the 
very same thing. It has repossessed the equipment, 
caused rBpairs to be made thereon and has waited "sev-
eral 1nonths" to sell the machinery. It certainly treated 
the n1achine as its own; it did not even bother to account 
to the Defendants for the sale price when it was sold. 
The case of Franz v. Hair) (1930) 76 Utah 281, 289 
P. 130, 83 ALR 990 cites the IXL case as good law. Down 
to the present day courts have held this to be good law. 
See Gauntt v. I vie) 29 Ill. App. 2d 186, 172 NE 2d 366; 
Webb v. Litz (Ala. App.) 902 So. 2d 915. 
Of particular interest in this connection is the case 
of International Harvester Co v. Bauer (1917) 82 Ore. 
686, 162 P. 856, (as reported in 37 ALR 91 at 93) in which 
it was held that where a contract of conditional sale was 
in the form of a lease, with a provision that, in the event 
of the default of the Buyer, the Seller may resume pos-
session of the property and apply the amount paid as 
earned rentals, the retaking of the property by the Seller 
amounts to a rescission of the contract which relieves the 
Buyer from further obligation for the balance due on 
the purchase price. 
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POINT V. 
'THAT IF THE PLAINTIFF WERE ENTITLED TO RE-
POSSESS AND SELL THE PROPERTY WHICH W A8 THE 
SUBJECT OF THE CONDITIONAL SALES CONTRACT AND 
HOLD THE DEFENDANT LIABLE FOR ANY DEFICIENCY, 
IT DID NOT DILIGENTLY PROCEED TO REPOSSESS AND 
SELL THE MACHINERY OR TO GET THE BEST PRICE 
OBTAINABLE THEREFOR, AND SO IS ENTITLED TO NO 
RECOVERY. 
The Plaintiff herein did not take any steps to limit 
or mitigate its damage after the default. Although the 
contract was in default very early in the life of the agree-
ment, Plaintiff did not repossess the property for a peri-
od of thirt~en months, and then did not resell the property 
for a considerable time after repossession. 
It is uniformly held that a seller under conditional 
sales contracts must proceed with diligence to protect 
hls interest if he intends to hold the defaulting pur0haser 
for any deficiency. K·nudsen 111usic Co. v. Masterson 
(1952) 121 Utah 252, 240 P.2d 973. See also 49 ALR 2d 
15 at Pages 25 and 66. The cases cited therein as well 
as the Knudsen case hold that if the seller is entitled to 
recover any deficiency against the buyer for the differ-
ence between the unpaid contract price and the proceeds 
of the resale after repossession, the seller must proceed 
diligently. Since this "~as not· done here, the Plaintiff 
is harDed from any recovery. 
POINT VI. 
THAT ASSUMING THE CONTRACT IN QUESTION 
IS IN FACT A RENTAL AGREEMENT, THE PLAINTIFF 
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OWED DEFENDANT AN OBLIG.A:TION TO MITIGATE THE 
DAMAGE, WHICH IT DID NOT DO, AND IS THEREFORE 
ENTITLED TO NO RECOVERY. 
Defendant and Cross-Appellant contends that the 
contract in question must he found to he a conditional 
sales contract as a matter of law. In the event, however, 
the Court should hold that the contract is a rental agree-
ment, then Plaintiff would be unjustly enriched if its 
claims were allowed. 
Plaintiff is suing for rental payments for seventeen 
months in the total sum of $7,176..00. In addition, the 
Plaintiff has received payments of $1,000.00 on the con-
tract. On top of that, it has repossessed the machinery 
which is the subject matter of the contract and has sold 
the same for $6,400.00. If judgment is granted as prayed, 
the Plaintiff would receive a total of $14,576.00 from 
the transaction, plus all of its costs and attorneys' fees. 
The retail price of the machinery is $10,950.00. If 
judgment were granted as prayed, the Plaintiff would 
make a profit on the transaction equal to $3,626.00. It 
would n1ake a profit of $2,312.00 over and above its 
original contract price, which already contemplated a 
profit. 
It surely cannot seriously be contended that any 
rental agreement would justify this result. It was ex-
pressly agreed between the parties by the terms of the 
written contract that upon the payment of the total 
sum of $12,264.00, Plaintiff would transfer title to the 
equipment to Defendants. Are they entitled to make an 
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additional $2,312.00 clear in the event of default~ 
There is no question but what Plaintiff owed a duty 
to Defendant upon repossession to mitigate its damages. 
It should at least apply the proce·eds of the resale to the 
credit of Defendants' account, or in the alternative, have 
re-leased the property to another lessee and credited the 
proceeds of said rental to Defendants' account. Not hav-
ing done this, Plaintiff must he precluded from recoV'ery. 
SUMMARY 
Based upon the foregoing points it is contended that 
Plaintiff is precluded from any recovery because the 
contract is a conditional sales contract and because Plain-
tiff repossessed the equipment and thus rescinded the 
contract; that in any event, Plaintiff did not proceed with 
diligence to secure its right against the equipment and 
that it is precluded from recovering on that basis also. 
In the event the court concludes the contract is a 
rental agreement, then it is respectfully submitted that 
Plaintiff is still barred from recovery. Any other holding 
would be unconscionable and would give undue profit to 
the Plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MOYLE & MOYLE 
By HARDIN A. WHITNEY, JR. 
Attorneys fo·r Respondent and 
Cross-Appellant E. J. Ma.yhew 
810 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
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